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"It is a settled policy in Oklahoma that the courts will not uphold any
shift or device by which the lender may receive more than ten per cent
per annum for the use or forbearance of money. It makes no difference
whether the excess received be called a bonus or commission...."
Since the dealings between the parties litigant in the principal

case had extended over a period of years and were apparently
confined to loans made by the plaintiff to the defendant, it would
seem that the circumstances justified close scrutiny into the facts
and that the trial court might well have found sufficient evidence
to support the defense of usury. The attitude of the courts generally is aptly expressed in Lawrence v. Grifiin:4
"Courts come short of their duty where they permit so transparent a
fraud upon the law as this case presents to go unrebuked. It is their duty
to penetrate beneath the lawful semblance which the transaction wears

and to condemn the unlawful thing which seeks concealment."
However, inasmuch as the evidence was conflicting and since
the trial court was sitting as a jury, the supreme court was apparently correct in upholding the lower court's findings. Clearly,
the burden was upon the defendant to show by a preponderance
of the evidence that the transaction was in fact usurious, and
whether or not there was usury was a question of fact to be determined by the court sitting as a jury.5
Wellington Y. Chew.

CONFLICT OF LAWS
Arkansas, Louisiana. Two recent cases in the Southwest have
reiterated the rule in the United States as regards the domicile of
members of the armed forces. In American jurisdictions, in order
to acquire a domicile of choice, two elements must concur:
(1) bodily presence within a new locality and (2) no present
Tex. 400, 402 (1867).
5 Forman v. Needles et al., 78 Okla. 105, 188 Pac. 1087 (1920) ; Porter v. Rott, 116
Okla. 3, 243 Pac. 160 (1926).
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intention to remove therefrom.' The rule as to members of the
armed forces, prisoners, and individuals who are not in a position
voluntarily to choose a domicile is somewhat different. The rule
has been formulated that a member of the armed forces retains
as his domicile that which he possessed at the time of his entry
into the service and that he cannot acquire a new domicile of
choice unless an extremely clear showing of intention can be
made.2 The additional element of presence, of course, must exist.
The Arkansas case of Plough v. Plough3 recognizes the prevailing rule that a soldier's domicile at the time of entering the
service is considered his domicile for all purposes while in the
service. This case involved an inductee from South Carolina suing
for a divorce in Arkansas while stationed at Camp Chaffee, Arkansas, pursuant to military orders. The only evidence offered to
establish domicile in Arkansas was his presence at Camp Chaffee
and his testimony, "I am figuring on remarrying and making this
my home." It appeared that he intended to marry a South Carolina girl if his divorce suit was successful. The court's requirement was "that the intention to remain in this State must be manifested by overt acts." 4 The court, therefore, held that "this bare
assertion, unaccompanied by voluntary conduct, fails to establish
the element of permanence that distinguishes domicile from
simple presence within the jurisdiction", 5 and found a lack of
jurisdiction to render a divorce.
Reaching a contrary result, but clearly distinguishable on the
facts, is the Louisiana case of Walsh v. Walsh,6 which aptly illustrates the qualifying clause in the general rule, i. e., unless a clear
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undisputed principle is amply annotated in the following authorities: 1
TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

(1935) 133 n. 1;

GOODRICH, CONFLICT

OF LAWS (3d ed. 1949) 60 n. 51; STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
18; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934)§ 15, Comment a.
2 STUMBERG. PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1937) 41; see Note, 148

1413 (1944).
sArk.,219 S. W. 2d. 947 (1949).
4 219 S. W. 2d. at 947.
, Ibid.
6
-La., 42 So. 2d 860 (1949), rehearing denied.

(1937)

A.L.R.
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intention of establishing a new domicile of choice can be shown.
In this case a soldier of some twenty-seven years service had divorced a wife in Louisiana and remarried. He was subsequently
killed in an accident, and his former wife brought this action to
set aside the divorce judgment principally on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction. The court found that the deceased, although having been stationed in many places throughout the world, had
lived longer at Barksdale Field, Louisiana, than at any other post.
In addition to his having lived some seven years in Louisiana,
testimony of relatives and friends to the effect that the deceased
considered Barksdale Field his home was put in evidence. Deceased kept all of his property, consisting principally of bonds
and insurance policies, in the local bank at nearby Bossier City,
Louisiana; his checking account was kept in the same bank, and
the testimony of a disinterested bank cashier that deceased, on
numerous occasions, had told her that he considered Barksdale
Field his home, was introduced. The court, finding that the evidence rebutted the presumption of continued domicile where
inducted, held that the deceased had in fact established a domicile
in Bossier Parish, Louisiana, and upheld the divorce decree.
It is apparent from these two decisions that the courts have
made a distinction between inductees and the so-called "professional soldier." They seem to recognize, and rightly so, that the
inductee, being in service for only a short time, has, in most cases,
actually no intention of making any particular place to which he
is sent his permanent residence. On the other hand, a "professional soldier" may certainly, during his years of service, form
a definite attachment to a particular locality where he has been
stationed with the intention of making it his domicile both while
in and upon leaving the service.
These decisions in no way change the well established law on
the subject, but rather emphasize the requirements necessary for
a serviceman to acquire a domicile of choice.
Patrick B. Gibbons III.

